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Abstract: 
 
Openness to experience—the enjoyment of novel experiences and ideas—has many connections 
to cognitive processes. People high in openness to experience, for example, tend to be more 
creative and have broader general knowledge than people low in openness to experience. In the 
current study, we use a network science approach to examine if the organization of semantic 
memory differs between high and low groups of openness to experience. A sample of 516 adults 
completed measures of openness to experience (from the NEO Five‐Factor Inventory‐3 and Big 
Five Aspect Scales) and a semantic verbal fluency task. Next, the sample was split into half to 
form high (n = 258) and low (n = 258) openness to experience groups. Semantic networks were 
then constructed on the basis of their verbal fluency responses. Our results revealed that the high 
openness to experience group's network was more interconnected, flexible, and had better local 
organization of associations than the low openness to experience group. We also found that the 
high openness to experience group generated more responses on average and provided more 
unique responses than the low openness to experience group. Taken together, our results indicate 
that openness to experience is related to semantic memory structure. 
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In the Big Five personality model, openness to experience is commonly found to be related to 
cognitive processes. In an examination of behavioural, affective, and cognitive processes related 
to Big Five personality traits, openness to experience was chiefly characterized by cognition 
(Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002). Many studies link openness to experience to cognitive 
abilities such as intelligence, working memory, and creativity (DeYoung, Grazioplene, & 
Peterson, 2012; Kaufman et al., 2010; Kaufman et al., 2016). Few studies, however, have 
examined other cognitive factors, such as semantic memory—our knowledge about the word, 
such as word meanings, concepts, and categorizations of facts (McRae & Jones, 2013)—that 
might contribute to these relationships (Jauk, Benedek, & Neubauer, 2014; Kwantes, 
Derbentseva, Lam, Vartanian, & Marmurek, 2016; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, 2014). 
 
Recent computational research suggests that the structure of semantic memory could be a 
cognitive factor that underlies more general cognitive differences associated with openness to 
experience. Highly creative people, for example, exhibit more flexible, interconnected relations 
between concepts than less creative people (Kenett et al., 2018; Kenett, Anaki, & Faust, 2014). 
Likewise, people higher in fluid intelligence show greater structure (i.e. more order) in their 
semantic memory (Kenett, Beaty, Silvia, Anaki, & Faust, 2016). Given the links between 
openness to experience, creativity, and intelligence, the structure of semantic memory might be 
related to openness to experience. The present study thus examined the structure of semantic 
memory between groups of high and low openness to experience using a computational network 
science approach. 
 
Openness to Experience, Cognition, and Semantic Memory 
 
Openness to experience has many links to basic cognition. Perhaps the most established one is 
creative thought (Oleynick et al., 2017), to the point that ‘creativity’ has been considered as an 
alternative label (Johnson, 1994). People high in openness to experience are described 
as original, unconventional, imaginative, intellectual, curious, and creative (Johnson, 1994; 
McCrae & Costa, 1997). Open people tend to seek out new experiences and to be more sensitive 
to novelty in experiences of interest and pleasure (Fayn, MacCann, Tiliopoulos, & Silvia, 2015; 
McCrae & Costa, 1997). Diverse experiences have been shown to enhance cognitive 
flexibility—the ability to break old cognitive patterns, overcome functional fixedness, and make 
novel associations between concepts (Guilford, 1967; Ritter et al., 2012)—which is a core 
component of creativity (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Indeed, openness to experience is the 
most consistent predictor of creative achievement in the arts and sciences (Feist, 1998; Kaufman 
et al., 2016). 
 
In addition to creative output, open people's engagement in a variety of experiences leads to the 
acquisition of broad general knowledge. The breadth and depth of this knowledge is acquired by 
formal and informal education as well as life experiences (McGrew, 2009). People higher in 
openness to experience are consistently found to have higher crystallized intelligence—the 
accumulation of knowledge over time, including language, information, and concepts of a 
specific culture (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; DeYoung et al., 2012; McGrew, 2009). They are 
also more likely to spend their time doing activities that encourage the accumulation of 
information such as reading all genres of literature for pleasure (Finn, 1997; McManus & 
Furnham, 2006). In general, open people tend to be curious and have a motivation to learn, 
which makes them more likely to explore and invest in many knowledge domains (Kashdan, 
Rose, & Fincham, 2004; Silvia & Sanders, 2010; von Stumm, 2018). Thus, people high in 
openness to experience actively attain information that contributes to general knowledge and 
semantic knowledge, more specifically. 
 
To date, a handful of studies have implied a link between openness to experience and semantic 
memory. In one study, people high in openness to experience came up with more semantically 
distant verbs—determined via latent semantic analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997)—when 
cued to generate a creative verb for a noun (Prabhakaran et al., 2014). Interestingly, intelligence, 
working memory, and facets related to the openness aspect of openness to experience—defined 
by perceptual and aesthetic engagement—were related to semantic distance, but facets related to 
the intellect aspect of openness to experience were not (DeYoung et al., 2012). In another study, 
Kwantes et al. (2016) applied LSA to assess the semantic content of people's responses to 
scenarios that were associated with different Big Five personality traits—for openness to 
experience, the scenario was, ‘Where would you travel if you had an all‐inclusive trip and why?’ 
The authors found that people higher in openness to experience used more words in their 
response that were related to the descriptors of openness to experience (Kwantes et al., 2016). 
Finally, openness to experience is a consistent predictor of performance on semantic verbal 
fluency tasks—generating as many responses as possible for a single category—which taps the 
ability to recall semantic information stored in long‐term memory (e.g. animals; Sutin et 
al., 2011). Given the aforementioned evidence, people high in openness to experience might 
differ from people low in openness to experience in how they recall and use semantic 
information. Thus, investigating the structure of their semantic memory via semantic networks 
may offer a way to investigate these differences. 
 
Semantic Network Analysis and Measurement 
 
Recent research has applied network science tools to investigate cognitive phenomena such as 
the structure of language and memory (Baronchelli, Ferrer‐i‐Cancho, Pastor‐Satorras, Chater, & 
Christiansen, 2013; Borge‐Holthoefer & Arenas, 2010; De Deyne, Kenett, Anaki, Faust, & 
Navarro, 2016; Karuza, Thompson‐Schill, & Bassett, 2016). In semantic networks, nodes 
represent concepts or words in memory and edges signify the relations between them (e.g. 
semantic similarity). By structuring language and memory as a network, network science can 
directly and quantitatively examine classic cognitive theory and the operations of cognitive 
processes that take place in memory retrieval and associative thought (Anderson, 1983; 
Baronchelli et al., 2013; Collins & Loftus, 1975). Cognitive networks, for example, have 
identified mechanisms of language development (Hills, Maouene, Maouene, Sheya, & 
Smith, 2009; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005), shown how specific network parameters influence 
memory retrieval (Vitevitch, Chan, & Goldstein, 2014; Vitevitch, Chan, & Roodenrys, 2012; 
Vitevitch, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2016), and provided new insight into the semantic structure of 
second languages in bilinguals (Borodkin, Kenett, Faust, & Mashal, 2016). 
 
A popular way of constructing semantic memory networks is based on verbal fluency tasks 
(Goñi et al., 2011; Kenett et al., 2013). Verbal fluency tasks present the participant with a single 
category for which they generate as many category exemplars as they can (Borodkin et al., 2016; 
Kenett et al., 2013). In both methods, participants are given a limited amount of time to generate 
their associations (usually 60 seconds). For this study, we constructed our semantic networks 
using a verbal fluency task (i.e. the animals category). While different semantic categories have 
been used for this task, the animal category is the most widely used, as it has a universal 
taxonomy (i.e. the animal kingdom) and has shown only minor differences across different 
languages and cultures (Ardila, Ostrosky‐Solís, & Bernal, 2006). 
 
Semantic Network Terminology 
 
Of the network models that have been developed in network science theory, the small world 
network model (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) has been one of the most widely used to examine 
complex systems. Small world networks are defined by two main characteristics: the network's 
clustering coefficient (CC) and its average shortest path length (ASPL). The CC of a node refers 
to the extent that two neighbours of a node will themselves be neighbours (i.e. a neighbour is a 
node i that is connected through an edge to node j). In this way, the average clustering of the 
nodes in the network (referred to hereafter as CC) indicates how semantic information is 
organized at a local level (e.g. marine animals). A network with a higher CC suggests that 
exemplars that are near‐neighbours to each other (e.g. fish–dolphin–whale–shark) tend to co‐
occur. For example, Borodkin et al. (2016) have shown how the CC of the second language in 
bilinguals is higher, attributed to less organized semantic networks compared with the 
organization of the semantic network of their first language. 
 
The ASPL refers to the average shortest number of steps (i.e. edges) needed to traverse between 
any pair of nodes. In semantic networks, short path lengths indicate increased interconnectivity 
and smaller distances between concepts, which may relate to a greater ability to switch from one 
sub‐category to another, with fewer mediating associations (e.g. cat–fish–dolphin compared with 
cat–dog–fish–whale–dolphin). According to the Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT) model, 
lower ASPL might affect spreading activation—the activation of associations between 
concepts—and facilitate the search and retrieval of associations in memory (Anderson, 1983; 
Collins & Loftus, 1975). In this regard, Kenett, Levi, Anaki, and Faust (2017) have shown how 
shorter distances in a semantic network predict behavioural performance in a relatedness 
judgement task. Furthermore, higher creative ability has been related to lower ASPL (Benedek et 
al., 2017; Kenett et al., 2014). These studies have argued that the lower ASPL in the semantic 
network of high creative individuals may have contributed to their ability to generate more 
unique responses to target words than the less creative group (Kenett et al., 2014). 
 
The final network measure, commonly used to quantify semantic networks, is modularity. 
Modularity identifies how a network breaks apart (or partitions) into smaller sub‐networks 
or communities (Fortunato, 2010; Newman, 2006). The modularity statistic (Q) measures the 
extent to which the network has dense connections between nodes within a community and 
sparse (or few) connections between nodes in different communities. Thus, a network with a 
large Q would have more neatly compartmentalized (or more rigidly defined) communities in the 
network compared with a network with a small Q. In a semantic network, these communities 
might represent sub‐categories of a larger category. The animal category, for example, might 
have sub‐categories of pets, reptiles, insects, and marine animals (Goñi et al., 2011). Recent 
studies have highlighted the significance of modularity in cognitive networks in typical and 
clinical populations (Kenett, Gold, & Faust, 2016; Siew, 2013). For example, the semantic 
network of individuals with high functioning autism (Asperger's syndrome) exhibits a higher 
modularity value than matched controls, which is attributed to their rigidity in processing 
creative language (Kenett, Gold, et al., 2016). 
 
The Present Study 
 
Given the evidence presented previously, it seems that openness to experience might be related 
to semantic memory, which may facilitate the relationship between the trait and cognitive 
abilities. Our study is the first network analysis on the relation of openness to experience and 
semantic memory structure. We assessed openness to experience using two different inventories, 
the NEO Five‐Factor Inventory‐3 (NEO‐FFI‐3; McCrae & Costa, 2007) and Big Five Aspect 
Scales (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), to capture a broad, comprehensive 
measurement of the trait. We then divided the sample in half to form groups of high and low 
openness to experience. Previous studies, using a similar semantic network approach, have found 
that highly creative people tend to have semantic network structures that are more interconnected 
(low ASPL) and flexible (low Q; Benedek et al., 2017; Kenett et al., 2014; Kenett, Beaty, et 
al., 2016) than less creative people. Because of openness to experience's relationship with 
creativity, we predicted that the high openness to experience group's semantic network would 
exhibit similar network properties, namely, a lower ASPL and Q. Finally, because more efficient 
search and retrieval processes are supported by the structure of a small world network (i.e. a 
large CC and a small ASPL; Marupaka & Minai, 2011), we anticipated that the CC would be 
higher for the high openness to experience group than the low openness to experience. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
There were 516 participants in the current study who were included across three samples. The 
first sample was collected during the Fall 2015 semester through the University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro's (UNCG) psychology research pool as part of a broader research project. 
The total sample included 311 participants and was based on a power analysis on a desired 
sample size of 300, given that project's primary aims. A total of 56 participants were excluded 
because of missing verbal fluency data, 41 because of inattentive responding, and 8 because of 
being non‐native English speakers. The remaining sample consisted of 206 participants (54.9% 
Caucasian, 36.8% African American) who were primarily young adults (M = 19.16, SD = 3.33, 
78.6% female, 15% male) enrolled in psychology courses. Participants were compensated with 
research credits for their participation in the study. 
 
The second sample was collected during the Fall 2016 semester and the Spring 2017 semester at 
UNCG. Sample size was predetermined for the first author's thesis, which required at least 200 
people. Data collection ended after the Spring 2017 semester concluded. A total of 262 
participants were recruited using the university's psychology research pool, of which 60 
participants were excluded because of missing fluency data, 21 because of inattentive 
responding, and 8 because of being non‐native English speakers. The remaining sample 
consisted of 173 participants (53.2% Caucasian, 45.1% African American) who were primarily 
young adults (M = 18.61, SD = 1.10, 78.6% female, 20.2% male) and were enrolled in 
psychology courses. Participants were compensated with research credits for their participation 
in the study. 
 
The third sample (N = 168) was obtained from a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
study (Beaty et al., 2018). Sample size was predetermined on the basis of a grant proposal, with 
recruitment ending after 2 years upon project start (Summer 2015–Summer 2017). Participants 
were recruited from UNCG and its surrounding community using fliers around campus and local 
ads describing an fMRI study on creativity. This study had several common exclusion and 
inclusion criteria for neuroimaging research: participants must be right handed, have no past 
psychiatric disorder, and cannot currently be taking any medication. Participants were excluded 
if any of these restrictions were met or if they were unable to complete the neuroimaging 
procedures (e.g. unremovable piercings and claustrophobia). Five participants were excluded 
because of inattentive responding, 8 because of missing data, and 18 because of being non‐native 
English speakers. The final sample consisted of 137 participants (71.5% Caucasian, 27% African 
American) who were primarily young adults (M = 22.73, SD = 6.42, 73% female). This sample 
specifically oversampled art, music, and science majors to increase the sample's population of 
creative domains. Participants were compensated with $100 for completion of the study. 
 
Materials 
 
Openness to experience 
 
NEO personality inventory. For one sample, NEO Personality Inventory‐3 (NEO‐PI‐3) was 
completed, and for the other samples, the NEO‐FFI‐3 was competed. The NEO‐PI‐3 is a 240‐
item Big Five personality inventory that has been widely used around the world (McCrae, Costa, 
& Martin, 2005). The NEO‐FFI‐3 is a shortened version of the NEO‐PI‐3 and has good internal 
reliability (self‐report α = 0.78, informant α = 0.78) when compared with the NEO‐PI‐3 (McCrae 
& Costa, 2007). The NEO‐PI‐3 has six items per facet—ideas, values, fantasy, actions, feelings, 
and aesthetics—for a total of 48 items, and the NEO‐FFI‐3 has total of 12 items, with one to 
three items per facet. Participants responded using a 5‐point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Since all the questions used in the NEO‐FFI‐3 are 
used in the NEO‐PI‐3, only the 12 items that are included in both were used in the openness to 
experience score. The reliability for the NEO‐FFI‐3 measured in the sample was good (α = 0.75). 
 
Big Five Aspect Scales. Participants also completed the BFAS (DeYoung et al., 2007) openness 
to experience inventory, which splits personality traits into two aspects: openness (i.e. 
experiencing), reflecting perceptual and aesthetic engagement (10 items), and intellect, reflecting 
engagement in intellectual interests (10 items). Participants responded using a 5‐point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The reliability values for 
openness and intellect in this sample were acceptable (α = 0.70 and α = 0.78, respectively). For 
all inventories, items that were in administered in a reverse response format (e.g. ‘I do not like 
poetry’) were coded to correspond to values higher in the trait. 
 
Group construction. Because openness to experience is highly related to cognitive abilities and 
many items in the NEO‐FFI‐3 and BFAS inventories inquire about intellectual engagement 
(Christensen, Cotter, & Silvia, 2018), we followed Mõttus's (2016) suggestion to remove the 
items that had obvious overlap with the confounding factor of cognitive abilities and our 
outcome measure of semantic memory. We removed 11 items from the BFAS (including all 10 
of the intellect items) and 4 items from the NEO‐FFI‐3 (including all three of the ideas items) on 
the basis of the network analysis of four different openness to experience inventories of 
Christensen, Cotter, et al. (2018). This left us with 17 items in total. 
 
To create groups, we computed three mean facet scores on the basis of the 10 network‐identified 
facets of Christensen, Cotter, et al. (2018). These facets were aesthetic appreciation (six items), 
fantasy (six items), and openness to emotions (five items). One item pertaining to the non‐
traditionalism facet was placed into the fantasy facet on the basis of the high correlation 
(r = 0.54) between the two facets (Christensen, Cotter, et al., 2018). The mean scores of these 
facets were used as indicators in a one‐factor confirmatory factor analysis model, computed in 
Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), which resulted in a just‐identified model. Then, the sample 
was sorted on the basis of the latent variable score of openness to experience and split into equal 
halves: 258 low and 258 high. The current study treats openness to experience as groups rather 
than as a continuous variable because methods for representing semantic networks at the 
individual level are currently not well developed (Benedek et al., 2017; Zemla & 
Austerweil, 2018; Zemla, Kenett, Jun, & Austerweil, 2016). 
 
Verbal fluency 
 
Participants completed the animal category verbal fluency task. According to standard procedure 
(Ardila et al., 2006), participants had 60 seconds to ‘write down as many different ANIMALS as 
you can’. For each participant, repetitions, variation on roots, and non‐category members were 
converged (e.g. cats to cat) or excluded, using the SemNetToolbox1 package in R (R Core 
Team, 2018), from the final analysis. Responses for each participant were then binarized using 1 
for a response that was generated and 0 for a response that was not generated. 
 
Inattentive responding. Inattentive responding was captured with two checks in the NEO 
inventory (NEO‐FFI‐3 or NEO‐PI‐3; participants were instructed to select ‘Strongly Disagree’ 
and ‘Strongly Agree’) and the inconsistency subscale (six item pairs) of the Attentive 
Responding Scale (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; McKibben & Silvia, 2016, 2017). Participants were 
excluded if they scored 2 on the NEO inventory check or above 6 on the Attentive Responding 
Scale. 
 
Procedure 
A 
cross all samples, participants completed all tasks and scales on computers using MediaLab. 
Participants provided informed consent to participate in the study and received research credit or 
were paid for their participation. All studies were approved by the university's Institutional 
Review Board. 
 
Sample 1 
 
                                                          
1 The most up‐to‐date version of the SemNetToolbox package can be retrieved 
from https://github.com/AlexChristensen/SemNetToolbox 
This sample completed the openness to experience measures and verbal fluency task as a subset 
in a broader study, which investigated humour, intelligence, and personality (Christensen, Silvia, 
Nusbaum, & Beaty, 2018). First, the BFAS was completed (about 8 minutes), followed by the 
verbal fluency task, and then the NEO‐FFI‐3 was administered last (about 6 minutes). 
 
Sample 2 
 
The verbal fluency task was completed after participants provided demographic information. The 
BFAS was conducted next (about 8 minutes), and finally, the NEO‐FFI‐3 was administered 
(about 6 minutes). 
 
Sample 3 
 
The personality and fluency data were collected during the behavioural lab portion of an fMRI 
study. The BFAS inventory was collected first (about 8 minutes), followed by the NEO‐PI‐3 
(about 20 minutes), and finally, the verbal fluency task was administered. 
 
Statistical analyses 
 
Behavioural analyses 
 
Total number of responses. Pearson's correlation was used to examine the relation between the 
total number of responses given by each participant and the latent variable of openness to 
experience. For the groups, a t‐test was used to determine whether one group produced more 
responses, on average, than the other. A greater number of total responses might suggest a 
greater depth of knowledge for the animal category. 
 
Unique number of responses. To examine whether there was difference in the number of 
unique responses generated (i.e. responses generated by only one group), McNemar's chi‐
squared test was used (Agresti, 2003). The unique responses for the overall sample were used as 
the total number of unique responses. Responses reported by a group were given a 1, and 
responses not reported by a group were given a 0. A greater number of unique responses might 
suggest a greater breadth of knowledge for the animal category. 
 
Network analysis 
 
Semantic network construction. The semantic fluency data of the two openness to experience 
groups were analysed using a semantic network approach developed to analyse semantic fluency 
data (Kenett et al., 2013). In this approach, each node represents a category exemplar (e.g. frog) 
and edges represent associations between two exemplars. These associations are the tendency of 
the sample to generate exemplar b (e.g. toad) when they have also generated 
exemplar a (e.g. frog). 
 
The networks were constructed in the following way. First, the cleaned responses were separated 
into their respective group of openness to experience. Then, as in previous studies, all unique 
animal responses were matched between the groups, and only responses generated by two or 
more participants in both groups were included (Kenett et al., 2013; Kenett, Beaty, et al., 2016). 
This criterion allows a direct comparison between the networks because they are constructed of 
the same nodes, thus controlling for confounding factors (e.g. differences in nodes or edges; 
Christensen, Kenett, Aste, Silvia, & Kwapil, 2018; van Wijk, Stam, & Daffertshofer, 2010). 
These data matrices were structured so that each row contained all responses generated by one 
participant and each column was a category exemplar (i.e. an animal). 
 
Next, we calculated the word association matrix from the data matrices using the cosine 
similarity. The cosine similarity is commonly used in LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and is 
related to Pearson's correlation, which can be considered as the cosine between two normalized 
vectors. Below, we present the formula used to compute the cosine similarity: 
 
(1) 
 
where Ai represents the column vector of response a and Bi represents the column vector of 
response b. Unlike Pearson's correlation, the cosine similarity ranges from 0 to 1 because it is 
based on the co‐occurrence of responses. If two responses do not co‐occur, then the cosine 
similarity is 0. Therefore, associations are all positively valued, which has the advantage of not 
assuming that the lack of co‐occurrence suggests a negative association between two responses 
(whereas Pearson's correlation carries that potential). The response of dog, for example, occurred 
the most in the sample, so any response that is infrequent and does not co‐occur frequently is 
likely to have a negative association (e.g. dog–Siberian Husky, r = −0.141, p = 0.001; even 
though Siberian Husky is a breed of a dog). 
 
The word similarity matrix is examined as an n × n adjacency matrix of a weighted, undirected 
network, where each word represents a node (ni) in the network and the edges between two 
nodes represent the similarity between them. Most of the edges will have small values or weak 
associations, which represent noise in the network. To minimize the noise and possible spurious 
associations, we applied the triangulated maximally filtered graph (TMFG; Christensen, Kenett, 
et al., 2018; Massara, Di Matteo, & Aste, 2016). The TMFG constructs a sub‐network, capturing 
the most relevant information (i.e. removal of spurious connections and retaining high 
correlations) within the original network (Kenett, Kenett, Ben‐Jacob, & Faust, 2011). This 
approach retains the same number of edges between the groups, which avoids the confound of 
different network structures being due to a different number of edges (Christensen, Kenett, et 
al., 2018; van Wijk et al., 2010). Thus, the networks constructed by this approach can be directly 
compared because they have an equivalent number of nodes and edges. The TMFG method was 
applied using the NetworkToolbox package (Christensen, 2018) in R. 
 
To examine the structure of the networks, the edges are binarized so that all edges are converted 
to a uniform weight (i.e. 1). Although the networks could be analysed using weighted edges 
(weights equivalent to the correlation strength), this potentially adds noise to the interpretation of 
the structure of the network. Moreover, Abbott, Austerweil, and Griffiths (2015) show that 
weighted and unweighted semantic networks produce similar results. Thus, the networks are 
analysed as unweighted (all weights are treated as equal) and undirected (bidirectional relations 
between nodes) networks. 
 
Network analysis. All network measures—CC, ASPL, and Q—were calculated with 
the NetworkToolbox package. To statistically examine the validity of our findings, we applied 
two complementary approaches. The first approach, simulation of random networks for each 
openness to experience group, statistically tested whether the network parameters did not result 
from a null hypothesis of a random network. To this end, we generated a large sample of Erdös–
Rényi random networks with a fixed edge probability (Erdös & Rényi, 1960). Because all 
networks had the same number of nodes and edges, we simulated a distribution of random 
networks and compared the empirical network measures of both groups to this random 
distribution. For each simulated random network, we computed its CC, ASPL, and Q. This 
procedure was simulated with 1000 realizations and resulted in a random reference distribution 
for each measure. The empirical network measures were then compared with their reference 
distribution to evaluate its statistical significance. This was achieved via a one‐sample Z‐test for 
each network parameter. 
 
Second, we used a bootstrapping approach (Efron, 1979) to simulate and compare partial 
semantic networks for both groups. On the basis of previous studies (Borodkin et al., 2016; 
Kenett, Beaty, et al., 2016), the bootstrapping procedure involved random selection of half of the 
nodes of the semantic network. Partial semantic networks were constructed for each group 
separately for these random nodes. This method is known as without replacement bootstrapping 
(Bertail, 1997; Politis & Romano, 1994; Shao, 2003). Therefore, any differences between the 
two networks should be due to differences in the groups rather than differences in nodes or 
edges. This approach makes it possible to generate many simulated partial semantic networks, 
allowing for statistical examination of the difference between any two networks. To better 
examine the reliability of this approach, following the procedure of Epskamp, Borsboom, and 
Fried (2018), we also generated graded partial semantic networks for both groups that involved 
60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% of the nodes. For each partial network and for each group, the CC, 
ASPL, and Q measures were computed. This procedure was estimated with 1000 realizations for 
each of the graded partial bootstrapping analyses. This bootstrapped approach was computed, 
and its corresponding figures were generated using the SemNetToolbox package in R. 
 
R code, data, and materials sharing. All R code, data, cleaning procedures, analytic methods, 
and study materials are available on the Open Science Framework for reproduction and 
replication purposes osf.io/craky/. We report how we determined our sample size, all data 
exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011). 
 
Results 
 
Total and unique number of responses 
 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for age and number of verbal fluency responses for the 
full sample and the two openness to experience groups. In general, there was a significant 
correlation between the total number of responses and openness to experience 
(r(514) = 0.17, p < 0.001). With the total number of responses as the dependent variable, a t‐test 
found that the high openness to experience group produced more responses on average 
(M = 17.66) than the low openness to experience group 
(M = 16.57), t(514) = −3.53, p = 0.007, d = 0.24. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for age and total number of responses for the full sample and each 
openness to experience sample 
Sample Age Total number of responses 
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range 
Full (N = 516) 19.94 (4.33) 18–58 17.12 (4.61) 2–34 
Low (n = 258) 19.74 (4.54) 18–58 16.41 (4.49) 4–34 
High (n = 258) 20.14 (4.11) 18–58 17.83 (4.63) 2–27 
 
Across the sample, there were 345 unique responses in total. Using McNemar's test, a test for 
differences in proportions of paired nominal dichotomous data, we evaluated the proportion of 
these responses given by each group to assess the number of unique responses. The high 
openness to experience group generated 299 of these responses (96 of which were not given by 
the other group), and the low openness to experience group generated 249 of these responses (46 
of which were not given by the other group). The proportion of the number of unique responses 
in the high openness to experience group (0.867) was significantly larger than the proportion in 
the low openness to experience group (0.722), χ2(1) = 16.91, p < 0.001, φ = 0.22. Therefore, the 
high openness to experience group generated significantly more unique responses than the low 
openness to experience group. 
 
Network analysis 
 
Full networks 
 
The semantic networks of both openness to experience groups were analysed, and the different 
network measures ASPL, CC, and Q were computed for each network (Table 2). To visualize the 
networks (Figure 1), we applied the force‐directed layout of the cytoscape software (Shannon et 
al., 2003). In these 2D visualizations, nodes (i.e. animal exemplars) are represented as circles, 
and links between them are represented by lines. Since these networks are undirected and 
weighted, the links convey symmetrical (i.e. bidirectional) similarities between two nodes. 
 
Table 2. Network measures for the two openness to experience groups 
Openness to experience group 
Network measure Low High Random 
ASPL 3.19 2.84 3.01 (0.017) 
CC 1.03 1.05 0.038 (0.008) 
Q 0.590 0.521 0.366 (0.018) 
Note: The random networks display the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the simulated sampling 
distribution. ASPL, average shortest path length; CC, clustering coefficient; Q, modularity. 
 
 
Figure 1. A 2D visualization of the semantic network of the openness to experience groups. 
 
There were numerical (i.e. network measures) and qualitative (i.e. visualization) differences of 
each network structure between the groups (Table 2 and Figure 1, respectively). Large, 
individual figures of each group's network can be found in Figure S1 (low) and Figure S2 (high). 
The network of the low openness to experience group was visually more spread out and 
compartmentalized than the network of the high openness to experience group, which is apparent 
in the larger ASPL and modularity of the network, respectively. Conversely, the network of the 
high openness to experience was much more compact with decreased distance between 
associations, which is reflected in the lower ASPL, than the network of the low openness to 
experience group. To verify that the results of the full network analysis are not due to a null 
hypothesis, we conducted the simulated random networks analysis. This analysis revealed that all 
the empirical network measures for both openness to experience groups were significantly 
different from their simulated random measures (all p's < 0.001). 
 
Table 3. Partial network bootstrapped approach results 
Nodes remaining 
Network measures 
ASPL CC Q 
t d t d t d 
90% (df = 1998) −65.69 2.94 67.97 3.04 −65.26 2.92 
80% (df = 1998) −42.79 1.91 45.53 2.04 −41.33 1.85 
70% (df = 1998) −28.92 1.29 36.38 1.63 −30.86 1.38 
60% (df = 1998) −20.01 0.90 26.82 1.20 −25.98 1.16 
50% (df = 1998) −12.27 0.55 21.71 0.97 −19.16 0.86 
Note: 1000 samples were generated for each percentage of nodes remaining. t‐statistics and Cohen's d values are 
presented (Cohen, 1992). Negative t‐statistics denote the high openness to experience group having lower values 
than the low openness to experience group. All p's < 0.001. Cohen's d effect sizes: 0.50, moderate; 0.80, large; 1.10, 
very large. ASPL, average shortest path length; CC, clustering coefficient; Q, modularity. 
 
Partial boostrapped networks 
 
Next, we applied bootstrap analyses to statistically examine the differences in network structure 
across the networks of the openness to experience groups (Table 3 and Figure 2). For each partial 
bootstrap analysis, t‐tests were used to determine statistical differences in the bootstrapped 
partial networks. 
 
 
Figure 2. Plots of the bootstrapped partial network measures (1000 samples per nodes remaining 
percentage). Density plots are above the scatterplots (individual dots depict a single sample), 
with a black dot representing the mean. The y‐axis denotes the openness to experience group 
(high and low) and the percentage of nodes remaining (e.g. 90Low = 90% nodes remaining 
bootstrapped sample for the low openness to experience group).  
 
The partial networks of the high openness to experience group had a significantly smaller ASPL 
across the bootstrapped samples compared with the partial networks of the low openness to 
experience group. The effect size ranged from moderate (d = 0.55; when 50% of the nodes were 
dropped) to very large (d = 2.94; Table 3). The CC was significantly larger for the partial 
networks of the high openness to experience group, and the effect sizes across the bootstrapped 
samples were large to very large (d = 0.97 to 3.04), compared with the partial networks of the 
low openness to experience group. Similar to the ASPL, the partial networks of the high 
openness to experience group had a significantly smaller Q value than the partial networks of the 
low openness to experience group. Across the bootstrapped samples, the effect size for Q ranged 
from large to very large (d = 0.86 to 2.92). Overall, the effect sizes ranged from moderate to very 
large, demonstrating substantial differences in semantic network structure between the groups 
(Figure 2). 
 
Discussion 
 
The present study is the first to examine the relationship between semantic network structure and 
openness to experience. People higher in openness to experience came up with a greater total 
number of responses on average and produced more unique responses. The semantic network 
analyses revealed that the semantic network of the high openness to experience group exhibited 
better local organization of associations (higher CC) and was more interconnected (lower ASPL) 
and flexible (lower Q) compared with the semantic network of the low openness to experience 
group. Our bootstrapped partial network analyses corroborated these results, suggesting the 
relationship between openness to experience and the structure of semantic knowledge appears to 
be robust. The findings suggest that semantic knowledge is represented differently in highly open 
people, which may facilitate their ability to reach more remote associations and in turn be more 
creative. 
 
Semantic networks and openness to experience 
 
The network analysis of the full networks revealed that the network of the high openness to 
experience group had smaller ASPL and Q values and a larger CC value. These results are in line 
with our predictions. In general, these findings suggest that the high openness to experience 
group's semantic network had more efficient retrieval of associations, meaning their ability to 
generate responses via clustering (high CC) and switching (low ASPL) processes was superior to 
the low openness to experience group. Moreover, the high openness to experience group's 
network structure had a smaller Q, suggesting their associations were less rigid than the low 
openness to experience group. These findings are similar to semantic networks related to creative 
ability (Benedek et al., 2017; Kenett et al., 2014; Kenett, Beaty, et al., 2016). The full network 
results, however, are mostly qualitative because they cannot be statistically tested directly. 
 
Our quantitative assessment involved a partial bootstrapped network approach (Kenett et 
al., 2014). The partial bootstrapped networks revealed results that were in line with the full 
networks and consistent across the bootstrapped realizations. The partial networks of the high 
openness to experience group exhibited significantly smaller ASPL and Q and a larger CC than 
the partial networks of the low openness to experience group, supporting the findings for the full 
networks. In addition, the effect sizes ranged from moderate to very large, suggesting these 
differences are substantial. Notably, the more nodes that were retained, the larger the effect sizes 
were. This seems to suggest that, at the full network level, the network structures are very 
different. 
 
Overall, these findings suggest that the high openness to experience group had a more flexible 
semantic organization—that is, a less rigid network structure (smaller Q). A growing body of 
research is demonstrating Q's role in flexibility of thought, by constraining the spread of 
activation over semantic and phonological networks (Faust & Kenett, 2014; Kenett, Gold, et 
al., 2016; Siew, 2013). On the one hand, these studies implicate higher modularity in more 
structured networks, related to intelligence and language development (Borodkin et al., 2016; 
Kenett, Beaty, et al., 2016), until an extreme state of rigidity as seen in the semantic network of 
people with high functioning autism (Kenett, Gold, et al., 2016). On the other hand, other studies 
reveal that lower modularity is related to higher creative ability (Kenett et al., 2014). Thus, our 
results extend and further support the negative relation between modularity and flexibility in 
cognition. 
 
The high openness to experience group also had greater interconnectivity (smaller ASPL) 
between nodes in the semantic network, suggesting they could more easily reach more remote 
associations. This result also suggests that people high in openness to experience might be less 
likely to perceive disparate concepts as unrelated (Rossman & Fink, 2010). This quality could 
facilitate an enhanced ability to combine remote associations, which is thought to be a 
fundamental cognitive component of creative thinking (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). In 
addition, the high openness to experience group had a larger CC, which suggests greater local 
organization. These two characteristics—small ASPL and large CC—are related to the structure 
of a small world network, which might support a more efficient search through semantic space 
(Marupaka & Minai, 2011). Indeed, Anderson's (1983) ACT model suggests that this 
interconnected, flexible structure facilitates the search and retrieval of associations in memory. 
 
Total and unique number of responses 
 
Our behavioural findings support this notion: the high openness to experience group reported 
more response on average and more unique responses in general than the low openness to 
experience group. This was demonstrated by a small correlation between openness to experience 
and number of responses and corroborated by the t‐test performed between the two groups. 
Moreover, this result is consistent with previous work that suggests that people higher in 
openness to experience have greater general knowledge than people with lower openness to 
experience (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). Similarly, the high openness to experience group 
generated more unique responses than the low openness to experience group, which is likely 
because they have a flexible, interconnected semantic network structure that may have allowed 
better access to less common responses (Kenett & Austerweil, 2016). This finding is consistent 
with previous research, which demonstrated that people higher in openness to experience tend to 
provide more remote semantic responses (Prabhakaran et al., 2014). Overall, these results 
complement the network structure of the high openness to experience group, which had shorter 
paths and increased flexibility of relations between concepts. 
 
Limitations 
 
A few limitations exist in our study. Most prominently, although we removed items from the 
NEO‐FFI‐3 and BFAS that were related to intelligence and cognitive outcomes, these variables 
are only self‐report and do not directly assess explicit cognitive ability. Therefore, future 
research should parse out the extent to which the relationship of openness to experience and 
semantic memory structure exists beyond cognitive abilities. A second limitation was that we 
examined how openness to experience is related to semantic memory structure at the aggregated, 
group level. Openness to experience varies across people (Oleynick et al., 2017); thus, our 
aggregated group‐based semantic networks might minimize such important relations between 
openness to experience and semantic memory structure at the individual level. Approaches to 
represent individual semantic networks are currently being developed (Benedek et al., 2017; 
Zemla et al., 2016; Zemla & Austerweil, 2018). Thus, future work should use more sophisticated 
designs that are needed to examine the relation between openness to experience and semantic 
memory structure at the individual level. Finally, we applied bootstrapping methods as a way to 
statistically examine our network results, which is a common approach in cognitive and 
psychometric network analysis (Epskamp et al., 2018; Kenett, Gold, et al., 2016). In our 
approach, we removed a percentage of nodes from the full networks and compute partial 
networks. In psychometric networks, however, it is more common to remove participants 
(Epskamp et al., 2018). Removal of participants in semantic networks poses considerable 
difficulties, potentially leading to biasing the network measures and an over‐representation of 
infrequent responses in the group's semantic network, which would also lead to biased results. 
Further statistical methodological development is needed to develop statistical tools that are 
better able to statistically examine the validity of the results of such empirical networks. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present study applied network science methodology to examine the relation between the 
structure of semantic concepts and high and low openness to experience groups. We found that 
the high group of openness to experience was related to a semantic network structure that was 
more interconnected, flexible, and had better local organization of associations. Behavioural 
analyses complemented these network findings by revealing that the high openness to experience 
group generated a greater number of unique responses and more responses on average in a 
semantic verbal fluency task. These findings provide support for the relationship between the 
structure of semantic memory and openness to experience. This study also provides evidence that 
differences in personality may be directly related to the structure, recall, and application of 
semantic information (Kwantes et al., 2016). 
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